As multi-agent systems proliferate, there is increasing demand for coordination protocols that protect agents' sensitive information while allowing them to collaborate. To help address this need, this paper presents a differentially private formation control framework. Agents' state trajectories are protected using differential privacy, which is a statistical notion of privacy that protects data by adding noise to it. We provide a private formation control implementation and analyze the impact of privacy upon the system. Specifically, we quantify tradeoffs between privacy level, system performance, and connectedness of the network's communication topology. These tradeoffs are used to develop guidelines for calibrating privacy in terms of control theoretic quantities, such as steady-state error, without requiring in-depth knowledge of differential privacy. Additional guidelines are also developed for treating privacy levels and network topologies as design parameters to tune the network's performance. Simulation results illustrate these tradeoffs and show that strict privacy is inherently compatible with strong system performance.
to their states before sharing them with other agents. The other agents use privatized states in their update laws, and then this process repeats. Adding privacy noise makes this problem equivalent to a certain consensus protocol with measurement noises. This paper focuses on private formation control, though the methods presented can be used to design and analyze other private consensus-style protocols. The private formation control protocol can be implemented in a completely distributed manner, and, contrary to some other privacy approaches, it does not require a central coordinator.
Beyond the privacy implementation, we develop guidelines for calibrating privacy in formation control. Specifically, we bound the quality of formation, or performance of the system, in terms of agents' privacy parameters and connectedness of the network. We develop guidelines by using these bounds to trade off degraded performance for stricter privacy requirements and a less connected communication topology. This ultimately allows us to formulate privacy guidelines based on control-theoretic properties without requiring users to have an in-depth understanding of differential privacy. Guidelines are also developed by analyzing the sensitivity of system performance to changes in privacy parameters and communication topology to determine which has a larger impact on system performance. Furthermore, we develop necessary and sufficient conditions for when private formation control networks achieve a desired performance level.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II gives graph theory and differential privacy background.
Section III states the differentially private formation control problem and Section IV solves it. Section V provides guidelines for calibrating privacy based on performance requirements for specific communication topologies. In Section VI, we analyze the sensitivity of system performance to changes in privacy and communication topology.
Next, Section VII provides simulations, and Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section we briefly review the required background on graph theory and differential privacy.
A. Graph Theory Background
A graph G = (V, E) is defined over a set of nodes V and edges are contained in the set E. For N nodes, V is indexed over {1, ..., N }. The edge set of G is a subset E ⊆ V ×V , where the pair (i, j) ∈ E if nodes i and j share a connection and (i, j) / ∈ E if they do not. This paper considers undirected, weighted, simple graphs. Undirectedness means that an edge (i, j) ∈ E is not distinguished from (j, i) ∈ E. Simplicity means that (i, i) / ∈ E for all i ∈ V .
Weightedness means that the edge (i, j) ∈ E has a weight w ij = w ji > 0. Of particular interest are connected graphs.
Definition 1:
A graph G is connected if, for all i, j ∈ {1, ..., N }, i = j, there is a sequence of edges one can traverse from node i to node j. △ This paper uses the weighted graph Laplacian, which is defined with weighted adjacency and weighted degree April 7, 2020 DRAFT matrices. The weighted adjacency matrix A(G) ∈ R N ×N of G is defined element-wise as
Because we only consider undirected graphs, A(G) is symmetric. The weighted degree of node i ∈ V is defined as
Let λ k (·) be the k th smallest eigenvalue of a matrix. By definition, λ 1 (L(G)) = 0 for all graph Laplacians and
The value of λ 2 (G)) plays a key role in this paper and is defined as follows.
Definition 2 ( [11]):
The algebraic connectivity of a graph G is the second smallest eigenvalue of its Laplacian and G is connected if and only if λ 2 (L(G)) > 0. △ Agent i's neighborhood set N (i) is the set of all agents agent i can communicate with, defined as
B. Differential Privacy Background
This section provides a brief description of the differential privacy background needed for the remainder of the paper. More complete expositions can be found in [4] , [12] . Overall, the goal of differential privacy is to make similar pieces of data appear approximately indistinguishable from one another. Differential privacy is appealing because its privacy guarantees are immune to post-processing [12] . For example, private data can be filtered without threatening its privacy guarantees [4] . More generally, arbitrary post-hoc computations on private data do not harm differential privacy. In addition, after differential privacy is implemented, an adversary with complete knowledge of the mechanism used to implement privacy has no advantage over another adversary without mechanism knowledge [1] , [2] .
In this paper we use differential privacy to privatize state trajectories of mobile autonomous agents. We consider vector-valued trajectories of the form Z = (Z(1),
The set ℓ d p only contains trajectories that converge to the origin. However, we want to privatize arbitrary trajectories, including those that do not converge at all. To do so, we consider a larger set of trajectories. Let the truncation operator P T be defined as
April 7, 2020 DRAFT Then we define the setl
and we will privatize state trajectories in this set.
Consider a network of N agents, where agent i's state trajectory is denoted by x i . The k th element of agent i's trajectory is x i (k) ∈ R n for n ∈ N. Agent i's state trajectory belongs tol n 2 . Differential privacy is defined with respect to an adjacency relation. We provide privacy to single agents' state trajectories (rather than collections of trajectories as in some other works), and our choice of adjacency relation is defined for single agents. In the case of dynamic systems, the adjacency relation gives a notion of how similar trajectories are and specifies which trajectories must be made approximately indistinguishable from each other.
Definition 3 (Adjacency [5] ): Fix an adjacency parameter b i > 0 for agent i. Adj bi :l n 2 ×l n 2 − → {0, 1} is defined as
In words, two state trajectories of agent i are adjacent if and only if the ℓ 2 -norm of their difference is upper bounded by b i . This means that every state trajectory within distance b i from agent i's state trajectory must be made approximately indistinguishable from it to enforce differential privacy.
To calibrate differential privacy's protections, agent i selects privacy parameters ǫ i and δ i . These parameters determine the level of privacy afforded to x i . Typically, ǫ i ∈ [0.1, ln 3] and δ i ≤ 0.01 for all i [5] . The value of δ i can be regarded as the probability that differential privacy fails for agent i, while ǫ i can be regarded as the information leakage about agent i.
The implementation of differential privacy in this work provides differential privacy for each agent individually.
This will be accomplished by adding noise to sensitive data directly, an approach called "input perturbation" privacy in the literature [13] . The noise is added by a privacy mechanism, which is a randomized map. We now provide a formal definition of differential privacy, which states the guarantees a mechanism must provide. First, fix a probability space (Ω, F , P). We are considering outputs inl n 2 and use a σ-algebra overl n 2 , denoted Σ n 2 [14] . Definition 4 (Differential Privacy): Let ǫ i > 0 and δ i ∈ [0, 1 2 ) be given. A mechanism M :l n 2 × Ω − →l n 2 is
The Gaussian mechanism will be used to implement differential privacy. The Gaussian mechanism adds zero- Lemma 1 (Gaussian Mechanism [4] ): Let b i > 0, ǫ i > 0, and δ i ∈ (0, 1 2 ) be given, and fix the adjacency relation Adj bi . Let y i ∈l n 2 . The Gaussian mechanism for (ǫ i ,δ i )-differential privacy takes the formỹ i (k) = y i (k) + w i (k), where w i is a stochastic process with w i (k) ∼ N (0, σ 2 i I n ) and
This mechanism provides (ǫ i ,δ i )-differential privacy to y i .
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section we state and analyze the differentially private formation control problem. i. Implement the formation control protocol
in a differentially private manner.
ii. Analyze the relationship between network performance, privacy, and the underlying graph topology. △
We will solve Problem 1 by bounding the performance of the network in terms of the privacy parameters of each agent and the algebraic connectivity of the underlying graph. This will allow us to analyze the relationship between performance, privacy, and topology.
Remark 1:
We consider formation control in R n , which is equivalent to running n scalar-valued formation controllers. Therefore, we analyze the scalar case. This simplifies the forthcoming analysis while also giving a granular error analysis that allows for controlling error in each dimension independently. The n-dimensional controller is simply an n-fold replication of the scalar-valued controller. If an overall error bound for all dimensions is necessary, one need only multiply the forthcoming one-dimensional error bounds by the number of dimensions, n.
Before solving Problem 1, we give the necessary definitions for formation control. First, we define agent-and network-level dynamics. Then, we detail how each agent will enforce differential privacy. Lastly, we explain how differentially private communications affect the performance of a formation control protocol and how to quantify quality of a formation.
A. Multi-agent Formation control
The goal of formation control is for agents in a network to assemble into some geometric shape or set of relative states. Multi-agent formation control is a well researched problem and there are several mathematical formulations one can use to achieve similar results [15] - [21] . We will define relative distances between agents that communicate and the control objective is for all agents to maintain the relative distances to each of their neighbors. This approach is similar to that of [17] and the translationally invariant formations presented in [21] .
We define ∆ ij ∈ R n for all (i, j) ∈ E as the desired relative distance between agents i and j. For the formation to be feasible, ∆ ij = −∆ ji for all (i, j) ∈ E. Agent i has state y i (k) ∈ R n at time k and the network control
It is important to note that there is an infinite set of points that can be in formation; the formation can be centered around any point in R n and meet the control requirement, i.e., we allow formations to be translationally invariant [21] . Now we define the agents' update law. Let {p 1 , ..., p N } be any collection of points in formation such that p j − p i = ∆ ij for all (i, j) ∈ E and let p = (p T 1 , . . . , p T N ) T ∈ R nN be the network-level formation specification. We consider the formation control protocol
As noted in Remark 1, we analyze convergence of Equation (1) at the component level. Thus, while y i ∈ R n , we select an arbitrary l ∈ {1, . . . , n} and provide analysis for
i.e., each agents l th component, which proceeds identically for each l ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Below, we also use the vector of l th components of p, denoted
Then we analyzex
Letting P = I − γL(G), we may writex(k + 1) = Px(k). In this form, we have the following convergence result.
Lemma 2 ( [20], Theorem 2):
If G is connected, P is doubly stochastic, and γ ∈ (0, 1 dmax ), then the protocol in Equation (2) reaches consensus asymptotically andx(k) − → 1 T 1 nx (0)1. Because the protocol in Equation (2) reaches consensus overx, it solves the translationally invariant formation control problem [21] . Using δ ij to denote the state offset between agents j and i in the appropriate dimension, the node-level protocol in Equation (1) can be rewritten for a single component as
which we use below.
B. Private Communications
When agent j transmitsx j (k) to the agents in N (j), it is potentially exposing its state trajectory, x j , to them and adversaries or eavesdroppers. Agent j therefore sends a differentially private version ofx j (k) to its neighborhood.
Agent j starts by selecting privacy parameters ǫ j > 0, δ j ∈ (0, 1 2 ), and adjacency relation Adj bj with b j > 0. Agent j then privatizes its state trajectory x j with the Gaussian mechanism. Letx j denote the differentially private version of x j , where, pointwise in time,
Thus agent j keeps the trajectory x j differentially private. Agent j then sharesx j (k) =x j (k) − q j , which is also differentially private because subtracting q j is merely post-processing [12] . April 7, 2020 DRAFT
C. Private Formation Control
When each agent is sharing differentially private information, the node-level formation control protocol becomes
where agent i usesx i rather thanx i because it always has access to its own unprivatized state. The stochastic nature of this protocol implies that agents no longer exactly reach a formation, and, in particular, the states will never exactly converge to a steady-state value.
To analyze performance, let
which is the state vector the protocol in Equation (2) 
be the steady-state error of the network.
Problem 1 requires us to quantify the relationship between privacy, encoded by (ǫ i , δ i ); performance, encoded by e ss ; and topology, encoded by λ 2 . These quantitative tradeoffs are the subject of the next section.
IV. DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE FORMATION CONTROL
In this section we solve Problem 1. First, we show how the private formation control protocol can be modeled as a Markov chain. Then, we solve Problem 1 by deriving performance bounds that are functions of the underlying graph topology and each agent's privacy parameters.
A. Formation Control as a Markov chain
Problem 1 takes the form of a consensus protocol with Gaussian i.i.d. noise perturbing each agent's state, which has been previously studied in [15] . We begin by expandingx j (k) in Equation (4), which yields
For the purposes of analysis, we will consider equivalent network-level dynamics given as follows. (6) can be expanded as
The last term encodes privacy noise. Without this term we have formation control without noise, which can be represented at the network level asx(k + 1) = Px(k). Next, let z i (k) = γ j∈N (i) w ij v j (k). Using the fact that
For analysis, we use the network-level update law
The main result of this paper uses the fact that a stochastic matrix P can serve as the transition matrix of a Markov chain and the properties of the Markov chain can be used to analyze the network dynamics associated with P .
Before stating our main results we first define the conditions under which a network modeled by an undirected, weighted, connected graph can be modeled as a Markov chain and establish the properties of this Markov chain.
Lemma 4:
For an undirected, weighted, simple, connected graph G, let γ > 0 be given. If for all i the graph weights are designed such that γ j∈N (i) w ij < 1, then the matrix P = I − γL(G) is doubly stochastic.
Proof: The weighted graph Laplacian has row i
Then row i of P is row i of I − γL(G), which is
If agents i and j are not neighbors, then w ij = 0, which implies that j∈N (i) w ij = N j=1 j =i w ij . Then Because w ij ≥ 0 and γ j∈N (i) w ij < 1, every entry of P is greater than or equal to 0. Because the sum of every row of P is 1 and every entry is greater than or equal to 0, P is row stochastic. The same procedure can be used to show that P is column stochastic because w ij = w ji for all (i, j) ∈ E. Therefore P is doubly stochastic.
Graph Laplacian properties can be used to make stronger statements. In particular, the Laplacian of an undirected graph is always symmetric, and therefore P is symmetric. Let the stationary distribution of the Markov chain be π, which satisfies π T P = π T . With the symmetry of P we have the following explicit form for π.
Lemma 5: If P is symmetric, then its stationary distribution is π = 1 N 1. Proof: See [22, Chapter 4 ]. Furthermore, we can make a stronger statement about P . Lemmas 4-6 allow us to develop bounds on the steady state error in Equation (5) using [15] . That work details several specific cases of consensus protocols with noise vectors of the form in Equation (7). However, for this paper we are only interested in the results when P is symmetric and the noise is i.i.d, which take the following form.
Lemma 7 (From [15] ): If P is irreducible, aperiodic, and reversible, and if the noises at the nodes are uncorrelated, such that the off diagonal elements of Z are 0 and z(k) ∼ N (0, Z), then e ss is bounded via
where K(P 2 ) is the Kemeney constant of the Markov chain with transition matrix P 2 .
In this work, given that P = I − γL(G), we wish to relate K(P 2 ) to the agents' graph topology encoded in L(G). We do so with the following bound. 
Proof: The bounds on K(P ) are derived in [25] . These results also imply N −1
B. Solving Problem 1
Now we state the first of our main results: a bound on performance in terms of agents' level of privacy and underlying graph topology. If γ j∈N (i) w ij < 1, γ ∈ 0, 1 dmax , G is connected and undirected, and σ i ≥ κ(δ i , ǫ i )b i for all i, then e ss is upper-bounded by
Proof: With Lemma 7, e ss ≤ max i s 2 i π i K(P 2 ). Then using Lemma 8 to upper bound K(P 2 ) gives
.
Recalling from Lemma 3 that
Then, because π i = 1 N for all i and w ij ∈ (0, 1),
Plugging this result back into the upper bound gives
) .
We can simplify Theorem 1 when each agent has the same privacy parameters. Next, and from this point on, we consider the case where σ = κ(δ, ǫ)b so that each agent adds the minimum amount of noise needed to attain (ǫ, δ)differential privacy.
Corollary 1 (Homogeneous Privacy Parameters):
Let each agent in the network have the privacy parameters ǫ and δ and the adjacency parameter b. Then
The rest of the paper focuses on the homogeneous case presented in Corollary 1, though all forthcoming results are easily adapted to the heterogeneous case by considering minima and maxima over all agents where appropriate.
V. NETWORK DESIGN GUIDELINES
In this section we give guidelines for designing a differentially private formation control network. The question of interest is: Given a specific communication topology, how much privacy is each agent allowed to have for e ss ≤ e R ? As noted in Remark 1, we do this for each dimension of formation control individually. A smaller value of ǫ corresponds to being more private. Therefore an upper bound on e ss , which is the measure of system performance, implies a lower bound on ǫ, each agent's privacy parameter.
We derive an impossibility result and sufficient conditions in terms of ǫ for e ss ≤ e R for specific networks. We consider connected graphs G with uniform weights, where w ij = w for all (i, j) ∈ E. By construction, the graphs we consider in this paper are weight-balanced, which implies that for any weights, the protocol in Equation (2) will converge to the unweighted average as seen in Lemma 2. Throughout this section we fix δ to be some small number and let ǫ vary to tune the level of privacy, which is common in differential privacy implementations [26] .
In general, a more connected topology, i.e., one with larger λ 2 (G), can accommodate stronger privacy and still achieve the desired level of performance. This principle is used to determine the conditions under which it is impossible to satisfy e ss ≤ e R , shown next.
Theorem 2 (Impossibility Result): Given a network of N agents with specified ǫ, δ, b, and e R , compute λ 2 (G).
Then e ss ≤ e R cannot be assured if
where z 1 = γ(N −1) 2 2−γλ2(G) .
Proof: Being unable to achieve e ss ≤ e R is equivalent to requiring
This holds if and only if
Then, using κ(δ, ǫ) 2 = 1 4ǫ 2 (K δ + K 2 δ + 2ǫ) 2 , we solve for ǫ, giving
We now derive necessary and sufficient conditions for assuring e ss ≤ e R for common graphs: the complete graph, line graph, cycle graph, and star graph. These conditions can easily be checked a priori and give a network designer a simple means of determining whether a specific network will meet performance requirements. Proofs of Corollaries 3-5 are similar to that of Corollary 2 and are omitted.
Corollary 2 (Complete graph):
The complete graph has algebraic connectivity λ 2 (L(G)) = wN [27] . Consider a network of N agents with specified ǫ, δ, γ, b, w, and e R , and communication topology modeled by the complete graph. The network can be shown to satisfy e ss ≤ e R if and only if
Proof: The complete graph satisfies the design requirements if e ss ≤ e R . This is assured if For the complete graph with all weights equal to w, we have λ 2 (L(G)) = wN and thus we require
Then using κ(δ, ǫ) 2 = 1 4ǫ 2 (K δ + K 2 δ + 2ǫ) 2 we solve the inequality for ǫ to find .
Corollary 4 (Line Graph):
The line graph has algebraic connectivity λ 2 (L(G)) = 2w 1 − cos π N [27] . Consider a network of N agents with specified ǫ, δ, γ, b, w, and communication topology modeled by the line graph. April 
Corollary 5 (Star Graph):
The star graph has algebraic connectivity λ 2 (L(G)) = w [27] . Consider a network of N agents with specified ǫ, δ, γ, b, w, and e R , and communication topology modeled by the star graph. The network is assured to satisfy e ss ≤ e R if and only if Table I. VI. SENSITIVITY RESULTS Theorem 1 and Corollaries 2-5 show that performance of a network is a function of the network topology, each agent's privacy parameters, adjacency relationship, step size, and the number of agents. Some of these parameters are global, in that the parameter depends on the entire network, and some are local, in that the parameter can change at the agent level. For example, the network communication topology is a global parameter while each agent's privacy parameter, ǫ, is a local parameter.
Consider the following example: Given a network that is not performing as desired, one option is to change the network's topology and allow more agents to communicate, while another option is loosening the agents' privacy requirements. Depending on design constraints, it may be more effective to allow more agents to communicate or to relax privacy requirements. It is useful to understand when changing ǫ is more effective than changing the network topology and vice versa. In this section we therefore analyze how sensitive network performance is to local changes in privacy and global changes in topology.
We start by letting e ss equal the upper bound found earlier, e ss = γ(K δ + √ K 2 δ +2ǫ) 2 b 2 (N −1) 2 4ǫ 2 N λ2(L(G))(2−γλ2(L(G))) . Define λ(δ, ǫ) = April 7, 2020 DRAFT K δ + K 2 δ + 2ǫ. Now we take the partial derivatives with respect to ǫ and λ 2 (L(G)):
These partial derivatives give an understanding of how much e ss changes with a change in either ǫ or the network topology. As mentioned previously, we would like to determine when changing one is more effective than the other, which leads to the following result.
Then e ss is more sensitive to λ 2 than ǫ when
or when
Proof: ∂ess ∂λ2 and ∂ess ∂ǫ are both negative, so e ss is more sensitive to λ 2 when ∂ess ∂λ2 < ∂ess ∂ǫ . This occurs when
. This inequality is satisfied by the bounds in the Theorem statement.
Remark 3:
These results can be formulated in such a way that there is some cost associated with changing λ 2 (L(G)) and a cost associated with changing ǫ. Making an optimal change to achieve performance criteria will largely depend on application. This will be explored in a future publication.
The results presented in Theorem 3 can be instantiated for specific graphs. For example, consider the following.
Corollary 6: Let δ = 0.00135, such that K δ = 3, and let ǫ = 0.01. Let γ = 1 10 . The network's performance is more sensitive to the network topology than ǫ when λ 2 > 5.55134.
To illustrate these results, consider the following. The star graph over N = 10 nodes has λ 2 = 1, which implies that the network's performance is more sensitive to changes in the privacy parameter ǫ. The complete graph over N = 10 nodes has λ 2 = 10, which implies the network's performance is more sensitive to changes in the network topology.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present private formation control simulation results and illustrate the results in Theorem 1. where row i denotes agent i's desired location in the formation. Thus p specifies a formation where agents 2-5 will form a square with agent 1 at the center.
We consider the homogeneous case where each agent has identical privacy parameters, (ǫ i , δ i ) = (ln 3, 0.00135) for all i and every agent also has an identical adjacency parameter b i = 2 for all i. Let γ = 1 5 . Let e 11 denote the error of the first element of agent 1's state. The protocol in Equation (4) was run for 100 time steps Figure 1 shows e 11 at every time step as well as the upper bound found in Theorem 1, where we see that e 11 never converges to 0 due to the stochastic nature of the protocol, but remains in some neighborhood of 0. The bound on e ss presented in Theorem 1 is on the expected steady state value of square aggregate error, though we see that this bound also holds point-wise in time for e 11 in this simulation. These results were typical throughout numerous simulation runs.
B. Theorem 1 Visualization
In Figure 2 we include a visualization of the Results of Theorem 1. The figure considers N = 50 agents and considers the homogeneous case where each agent has the same privacy parameters. We fix δ = 0.01, γ = 0.02, and b = 5. The purpose of this figure is to show the effects of changing the graph topology and privacy parameter ǫ on the upper bound on e ss . As the graph topology becomes more connected, λ 2 increases monotonically and in April 7, 2020 DRAFT Fig. 2 : A plot of e ss for different levels of privacy and connectedness. We fix δ = 0.01 and N = 50 and let ǫ and λ 2 vary. It can be seen that the largest error occurs when agents are not well-connected, which gives small λ 2 , and when agents keep information very private, which gives small ǫ. Figure 2 we see that if we fix an epsilon, e ss decreases as the topology becomes more connected. A smaller value of ǫ corresponds to a stricter privacy requirement. Figure 2 shows that as our privacy requirements become more strict, the upper bound on e ss increases. Figure 2 depicts ǫ ∈ [0.1, 1] and λ 2 ∈ [0, 50].
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the problem of differentially private formation control. This work enables agents to assemble formations while only sharing differentially private output data with a bounded steady state error.
We developed guidelines for calibrating privacy under different control-theoretic requirements. Future works will include adding a leader to the network, and further exploring the optimization problem of when it is more effective to change privacy parameters or the communication topology.
